No próxima 3ª feira, 28 de maio, pelas 18h00, realizar-se–á o seminário: “Bank organization and credit supply at difficult times: Evidence from the Lehman Crisis” na sala de Atos da Universidade Europeia.
The seminar "Bank organization and credit supply at difficult times: Evidence from the Lehman Crisis" will take place in acts room, o the next Monday, May 28, at 6:00 pm in the Universidade Europeia.
Alberto Franco Pozzolo is professor of economics at the University of Molise (Italy). He was formerly an economist in the Research Department of the Bank of Italy. His research has been published in international journals, including the Journal of Monetary Economics, the Journal of International Economics, and the Journal of Business. He is currently working on empirical banking and FDIs. Mr. Pozzolo graduated in Economics from Bocconi University in Milan and holds a Doctoral degree in economics from the University of Ancona and a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Southampton. He has visited a number of international universities, including the University of Chicago, Cass School of Business and Beijing Normal University.
Bank organization and credit supply at difficult times: Evidence from the Lehman Crisis
Do banks with different internal organizations react differently to exogenous shocks? Are some organizational structures better at helping ‘good’ firms facing temporary difficulties, but with high total factor productivity and better economic fundamentals and prospects? We answer this question by analyzing lending relationships of a representative sample of Italian non-financial firms in the 6-month period after Lehman’s failure.
Controlling for credit demand with firm’s fixed effects, we find that banks with internal organization that allow for a better use of soft information – because they have a smaller number of hierarchical levels and are specialized in lending to smaller, and typically more opaque firms – granted relatively more credit than other banks. Smaller firms also experienced a stronger reduction in credit supply from those same banks that have an internal organization that is less suitable to the transfer of soft information. Finally, banks specialized in dealing with SME lending show a better ability to help firms with higher productivity but under temporary financial distress (i.e., higher short-term risk).