Portal Estudante
  • Início
  • Eventos
  • Seminário: “Bank organization and credit supply at difficult times: Evidence from the Lehman Crisis
28 Maio
FCES

Seminário: “Bank organization and credit supply at difficult times: Evidence from the Lehman Crisis

Sala de Atos | Campus da Quinta do Bom Nome
Seminário: “Bank organization and credit supply at difficult times: Evidence from the Lehman Crisis

No próxima 3ª feira, 28 de maio, pelas 18h00, realizar-se–á o seminário: “Bank organization and credit supply at difficult times: Evidence from the Lehman Crisis” na sala de Atos da Universidade Europeia.

The seminar "Bank organization and credit supply at difficult times: Evidence from the Lehman Crisis" will take place in acts room, o the next Monday, May 28, at 6:00 pm in the Universidade Europeia.

Short Bio

Alberto Franco Pozzolo is professor of economics at the University of Molise (Italy). He was formerly an economist in the Research Department of the Bank of Italy. His research has been published in international journals, including the Journal of Monetary Economics, the Journal of International Economics, and the Journal of Business. He is currently working on empirical banking and FDIs. Mr. Pozzolo graduated in Economics from Bocconi University in Milan and holds a Doctoral degree in economics from the University of Ancona and a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Southampton. He has visited a number of international universities, including the University of Chicago, Cass School of Business and Beijing Normal University.

Abstract:

Bank organization and credit supply at difficult times: Evidence from the Lehman Crisis

Do banks with different internal organizations react differently to exogenous shocks? Are some organizational structures better at helping ‘good’ firms facing temporary difficulties, but with high total factor productivity and better economic fundamentals and prospects? We answer this question by analyzing lending relationships of a representative sample of Italian non-financial firms in the 6-month period after Lehman’s failure.

Controlling for credit demand with firm’s fixed effects, we find that banks with internal organization that allow for a better use of soft information – because they have a smaller number of hierarchical levels and are specialized in lending to smaller, and typically more opaque firms – granted relatively more credit than other banks. Smaller firms also experienced a stronger reduction in credit supply from those same banks that have an internal organization that is less suitable to the transfer of soft information. Finally, banks specialized in dealing with SME lending show a better ability to help firms with higher productivity but under temporary financial distress (i.e., higher short-term risk). 

Voltar

Siga-nos

CAMPUS DA QUINTA
DO BOM NOME

Estrada da Correia, nº53.
1500-210 Lisboa

CAMPUS DE SANTOS

Avenida D. Carlos I, nº4
1200-649 Lisboa – Portugal

CAMPUS DA LISPOLIS

Rua Laura Ayres, nº4
1600-510 Lisboa – Portugal

Contactos
Política de Cookies Universidade Europeia

O site da Universidade Europeia utiliza cookies próprios e de terceiros para melhorar o respetivo desempenho e a experiência do utilizador. Alguns cookies são obrigatórios para ter acesso aos conteúdos e serviços, outros são-lhe apresentados como opção e contribuem decisivamente para lhe oferecer uma experiência de qualidade superior que corresponde aos seus interesses.

Clique em ACEITAR E PROSSEGUIR para receber todos os cookies e aceder aos conteúdos. Se pretender escolher, em concreto, os tipos de cookies, clique em OPÇÕES DE COOKIES.


Politica de Privacidade
Política de Cookies Universidade Europeia

Decida, já, se pretende prosseguir de imediato para o site, aceitando os cookies utilizados nas nossas plataformas digitais. Clique no botão seguinte (ACEITAR E PROSSEGUIR).



Ou, em alternativa, se pretender dedicar mais tempo a esta operação, escolha as suas preferências! Tem todo o tempo do mundo.

Funcionalidades Básicas
Funcionalidades Avançadas (escolha uma ou todas)

Faça as suas escolhas dos vários tipos de cookies e clique em

SUBMETER PREFERÊNCIAS

Politica de Privacidade